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STEEL TARIFFS: A SHINING EXAMPLE
OF THE TENSION BETWEEN POLITICS
AND ECONOMICS IN THE UNITED
STATES TODAY
There is a degree of prejudice against bounties, from an appearance of giving away the public money without an immediate consideration, and from a supposition that they serve to
enrich particular classes, at the expense of the community.1

I. INTRODUCTION

O

n March 5, 2002, the Bush administration announced its
intention to impose tariffs ranging from 8% to 30% on
numerous categories of foreign-made steel.2 The President imposed the tariffs using the power granted him by the “safeguards” provision in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.3 All
told, President Bush levied tariffs on one-third of the steel
products imported into the U.S. each year.4 Reaction from U.S.

1. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, reprinted in INDUSTRIAL
COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 247, 292 (Arthur
Harrison Cole ed., 1928) (1791).
2. Press Release, The United States Mission to the European Union,
White House Explains Steel Import Relief Decision (Mar. 5, 2002), available
at http:// www.useu.be/Categories/Trade/Steel/Mar0502/FactSheetSteel
Decision.html [hereinafter USEU Report]. 30% tariffs were imposed on imports of plate, hot-rolled sheet, cold-rolled sheet, coated sheet tin mill products, hot-rolled bar and cold-finished bar. 15% tariffs were imposed on rebar,
certain tubular products, stainless steel bar and stainless steel rod. 13% tariffs were imposed on carbon and alloy fittings and flanges. Finally, 8% tariffs
were imposed on stainless steel wire. Id.
3. Id. See also Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487(1975)). Section 201 allows the
President, after a finding by the U.S. International Trade Commission of serious injury, to “take all appropriate and feasible action within his power which
. . . will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits
than costs.” Id. The President’s use of this power will be discussed in depth
throughout this note.
4. Peter Morici, Ph.D., Professor of International Business, University of
Maryland, College Park, The Impact of Steel Import Relief on U.S. and World
Steel Prices 7 (July 2002), at http: //www.steelnet.org/new/20020700_impact_
import_relief.pdf.
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trading partners affected by the tariffs came quickly, and the
speed of their reaction was matched only by the veracity of their
criticism.5 The list of countries bearing the brunt of President
Bush’s new tariffs reads like a “who’s who” of the U.S.’s closest
allies — companies in Germany, Great Britain, Brazil, Australia, South Korea and Japan all stand to lose substantial income
from steel exports to the U.S. as a result of these measures.6
The tariffs also affected steel products from Russia and China,
two countries whose political relationships with the U.S. are
less stable.7 While the President’s steel tariffs were not a complete surprise — there had been rumblings from the U.S. steel
industry since 1998 about its inability to cope with increased
imports from abroad8 — U.S. trading partners had hoped the
election of pro-trade, republican George W. Bush would stave
off the imposition of any new protectionist measures.9

5. CNN/World, EU Steeling for U.S. Trade War (Mar. 6, 2002), at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/03/06/steel.wto1110/index.html
(E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said, “[t]he U.S. decision to go down
the route of protectionism is a major setback for the world trading system”);
BBC News, Trade War Looms over Steel Dispute (Mar. 6, 2002) at http://news
.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1856760.stm. (Japanese Trade Minister Takeo Hiranuma said that Japan regretted that the U.S.’s decision had been made
“without listening to the voices of its trade partners”).
6. See BBC News, Trade War Looms Over Steel Dispute, supra note 5.
7. Id. See also CNN, Europe Angry at U.S. Steel Tariff (Mar. 5, 2002) ”),
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/03/05/steel/index.html (a Russian
official warned that U.S. tariffs “could have a serious impact on the atmosphere of Russian-American relations”); Joe McDonald, U.S. trade representative, visiting China, defends steel tariffs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 9, 2002 (Beijing has already demanded compensation from the U.S. for damage to its steel
industry); Meng Yan, WTO Panel on Horizon, CHINA DAILY, June 7, 2002 (Lei
Da, a senior economist with the Renmin University of China, said U.S. steel
tariffs may divert large amounts of steel exports into the Chinese market and
harm domestic prices).
8. See U.S. Trade Policies: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee,
Jan. 27, 1999, 1999 WL 34884 (Statement of J. Peter Kelly, President and
CEO of LTV Steel Co.) (“Unfortunately, foreign steel industries have been
more subsidized, more protected and more cartelized than any other industrial sector . . . . In fact, past foreign overcapacity and the resulting unfair
trade practices have harmed U.S. companies to the point where today the U.S.
industry in periods of strong manufacturing activity can no longer satisfy 100
percent of U.S. demand.”).
9. See Frank Mora, Viewpoint, Farm, Steel subsidies undermine Bush’s
free trade position, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 17, 2002, at B5 (the hopes of
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As it turned out, President Bush, who promised a commitment to free trade throughout his election campaign,10 agreed to
support tariffs soon after he was elected.11 Robert Zoellick, the
newly appointed U.S. Trade Representative, announced that
Section 201 action was being considered to help ailing steel
companies on March 8, 2001, only two months after the President was elected.12 President Bush officially began the process
of implementing tariffs in June 2001, when he instructed the
International Trade Commission to investigate the effects of
imports on the American steel industry.13
In hindsight, it seems as if President Bush intended to give
the steel industry its desired breathing room all along, despite
his pre-election allegiance to free trade.14 The question that the
U.S.’s trading partners must be asking, is why? President Bush
was enjoying an 80% approval rating in early March, 2002,15 so
it would seem as if he did not need to cater to the nowweakened steel producers lobby.16 Why would the President,
whose election platform trumpeted free trade as a cure for the

U.S. trade partners in Latin America were not unfounded, as President Bush
professed unequivocal support for free trade during his election campaign).
10. Robert Collier, Free Trade Battles Re-emerge with Bush, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 20, 2001, at A3. Bush faced numerous tough decisions in the wake of his
election as to whether or not he would forge ahead with his campaign promise
to promote free trade. The appointment of Robert Zoellick as the U.S. Trade
Representative seemed to imply that Bush would push for free trade. Id.
11. See Martin Crutsinger, U.S. Eyes Help for Steel Industry, AP ONLINE,
Mar. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 15178239.
12. Id.
13. USEU Report, supra note 2. Pursuant to the requirements for Section
201 import-relief, the President first had to submit the issue to the U.S. International Trade Commission for a ruling on whether or not steel companies
were being substantially harmed by unfair export practices of foreign producers. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)).
14. See Editorial, All Hat, No Cattle, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2002, at 18 (“The
President, in March 2002 insisted that ‘[t]rade produces liberty and freedom, .
. . [and] the U.S. is one of the most open markets in the world and we intend
to keep it that way.’”). His imposition of tariffs on steel and lumber imports
directly contradicts the notion that President Bush and his Administration
intend to protect the freedom of entry into American markets. Id.
15. Bob Zoellick’s Grand Strategy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002.
16. See A Tricky Business: Steel Companies Feel the Heat, ECONOMIST,
June 30, 2001 (today, the U.S. steel industry employs only 200,000 people).
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world’s economic ills, so quickly turn his back on the tenets of
globalization? 17
The answer, without chalking the President’s actions up as
another example of a politician not living up to his campaign
promises, lies in the idea that democracy and capitalism (the
seed from which the concept of globalized free trade has sprung)
simply may not make good bedfellows.18 This problem has
plagued politicians in the U.S. throughout its history,19 and it
comes to the forefront once again in the analysis of President
Bush’s steel tariffs. Unfortunately, the possibility that democracy and capitalism do not co-exist in harmony, in and of itself,
does little to explain the reasoning behind the President’s actions. More importantly though, it gives foreign companies and
their investors no basis upon which to evaluate the risks of future investments in the steel industry that might depend on the
availability of U.S. markets.20
The purpose of this note is to shed light on the reasoning behind President Bush’s imposition of steel tariffs, and to analyze
whether imposing tariffs was justified under the circumstances.
17. Jamie Dettmer, Steel Strikes a Blow Against Free Trade, INSIGHT MAG.,
Apr. 1, 2002, at 47 (President Bush began as a champion of free trade, but, as
always, domestic politics have a nasty habit of getting in the way of free
trade).
18. Lester Thurow, New Rules: The American Economy in the Next Century, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY 244, 250
(Patrick O’Meara et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Thurow, New Rules]. New
Rules discusses the changing role of the U.S. on the world stage. Thurow
argues that, while globalized free trade is a golden opportunity for the top
20% of the population, for the rest it will lead to lower wages and a lower
standard of living. Id. The disproportionate nature of these benefits can only
lead to problems in a democracy such as ours. Id.
19. See Stephen P. Magee and Leslie Young, Endogenous Protection in the
United States, 1900–1984, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD
ECONOMY at 145, 146–48 (Robert M. Stern, ed., 1988) [hereinafter Magee and
Young, Endogenous Protection] (two thirds of the changes in U.S. tariffs this
century are explained by economic variables such as unemployment, inflation,
and the U.S. terms of trade).
20. See John H. Jackson, Multilateral and Bilateral Negotiating Approaches for the Conduct of U.S. Trade Policies, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A
CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 377, 393 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988) [hereinafter,
Jackson, Multilateral and Bilateral Negotiating Approaches] (the influence of
narrow interests in the U.S. makes foreign governments nervous about the
effective commitment of the U.S. toward an international system of rules regarding trade and other economic matters).
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This note will examine both the consequences of imposing tariffs on steel products,21 and the question of whether the steel
industry is actually deserving of governmental protection.22
In order to properly evaluate the wisdom of the President’s
decision to impose tariffs, this note will first outline the context
of the President’s action. Section II will begin with a description of the history of arguments for and against free trade, and
end with a look at historical uses of trade restrictions that have
benefited the steel industry.23 The actual analysis of the President’s actions will then proceed along two semi-separate paths
of inquiry.
The first path of inquiry, in Section III, is the economic
analysis, but, since the U.S. government’s steel policy is inextricably linked to the political realm,24 it will undoubtedly touch on
some issues that are political in nature. The main question in
21. Article 8, ¶ 1 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, provides for compensation to countries affected by safeguard measures in the form of concessions or other “adequate means of trade compensation.” Agreement on Safeguards, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_browseDetail.asp?
preprog=3, reprinted in 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THIRD EDITION 295, 299 (John H. Jackson, et al. eds., 1995), [hereinafter, Agreement on Safeguards]. Article 14 of
the Agreement on Safeguards gives authority on dispute settlement to the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. Id. The question of whether President
Bush’s steel tariffs will incur these penalties will be discussed infra at Section
III.
22. Arguments of U.S. steel producers will be looked at in light of the effects of tariffs on steel consumers, and the general economy, in order to come
to a conclusion on this question. This analysis is borne out of the Section 201
requirement that actions “provide greater economic and social benefits than
costs.” Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1975)).
23. Much of the information in this section was gleaned from the works of
William A. Lovett, a staunch critic of the U.S.’s trade policy, and advocate for
a U.S. withdrawal from the WTO. See WILLIAM A. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE
POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 56 (1999); William A. Lovett, The
WTO: A Train Wreck in Progress, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 410, 425–26 (Nov.–
Dec. 2000); William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests: Implementing the Doha Round, 17 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 951, 961 (2002).
24. See THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP INC., BCG REPORT, BREAKING THE
STALEMATE: VALUE CREATION STRATEGIES FOR THE GLOBAL STEEL INDUSTRY
(July 2002), at 7, at http://www.bcg.com [hereinafter BCG REPORT] (many
decisions made by steel industry managers over the last 20 years have been
based not on economic reasoning, but on the presumption that the government would provide some degree of protection to their companies).

File: PRIEST base macro final.doc

1030

Created on: 6/21/2003 11:21 AM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM

[Vol. 28:3

the economic analysis of this note is whether President Bush
could rightly impose steel tariffs — under either Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974,25 or under the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) Agreement on Safeguards.26 Statistics provided by
U.S. steel producers, along with an analysis of historical trends
in the steel industry, will provide a factual basis for the conclusions of this Note. The results of this factual analysis will then
be compared with the language of the Trade Act of 1974 and the
WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, in order to determine the validity of the President’s actions. Economic analysis of the steel
industry will show that the President’s imposition of steel tariffs is not likely to be justified by a WTO dispute resolution
panel, and will therefore result in compensation in the form of
tariffs imposed by damaged nations on products of their choosing.27 This section will also make clear the fact that, when
weighed against their effect on steel consumers in the U.S. and
the likely WTO sanctions, President Bush’s steel tariffs cannot
satisfy the requirement of Section 201 that any action undertaken “provide greater economic and social benefits than
costs.”28

25. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201).
26. The Agreement on Safeguards requires members of the WTO to use
safeguards “only if that Member has determined . . . that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly
competitive products.” Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 21, at Article 2
¶1. If U.S. steel tariffs are deemed a violation of WTO rules, under Article 22
of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, appropriate compensation
would have to be paid, either in the form of reducing other trade barriers, or
by allowing the affected countries to institute tariffs on other products as they
see fit. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1995, art. 22 ¶¶ 1–3, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex Z, 31 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
27. See supra note 21; see also CNN/World, EC Compiles U.S. Tariff ‘Hit’
List (June 5, 2002) at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/06/05/eu.
tariffs/index.html (E.U. approved a list of goods — including textiles, steel,
and orange juice — which it plans on ‘hitting’ with retaliatory sanctions in
response to U.S. steel tariffs).
28. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201).
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The second path of inquiry, in Section IV, will be termed the
political analysis, although this analysis will incorporate some
decidedly economic issues.29 On the political side of the issue,
this note will first examine the reasons behind the steel industry’s formidable clout in the political arena. 30 It will then explain the problems facing the American industrial worker, and
the middle class in general, as they relate to economic globalization.31 This section of the note will also analyze the benefits
of protecting the steel industry versus the political costs, both at
home and abroad, that the U.S. has incurred in choosing to impose sanctions. Finally, this section will look at the steel industry’s importance as an element of America’s national defense.32
Because steel production is a necessity in times of war — to pro29. The economic issues discussed in the political analysis section will be
theory-based, and serve to explain why steel workers, and industrial workers
in general, are rightly worried about the impact of globalization on their way
of life. See infra Section IV.
30. See ECONOMIST, supra note 16 (although steel imports account for only
2% of imported products into the U.S. each year, 46% of U.S. anti-dumping
measures relate to steel products). The reasons behind the steel industry’s
disproportionate clout are both historical and contemporary. U.S. steel built
many of the symbols of American dominance, and the donations of Andrew
Carnegie, and others like him, still support cultural institutions throughout
the east coast and the mid-west. Steel has a place in the hearts of many voters in swing states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. See Michael Buchanan, Analysis: Politics of Steel, BBC NEWS, at http://
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1857207.stm. This makes ignoring
the plight of big steel a risky political move. Some political analysts believe
that Bill Clinton’s failure to renew Voluntary Export Restrictions on steel
caused Al Gore’s defeat, especially in West Virginia. Id.
31. See LESTER THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM: HOW TODAY’S
ECONOMIC FORCES SHAPE TOMORROW’S WORLD 75–78 (1996). The American
premium for unskilled labor has disappeared. Real per capita growth rose
40% from 1970 to 1996, while 60% of the workforce, in 1995, was working for
real wages below previous peaks. Id. This implies that America was competitively successful in this period, but a majority of its workers were not. Id.
32. See Facts About Steel: Preserving a Strategic American Industry (Customer brochure from “Stand Up for Steel”) (Sept. 30, 2002), at
http://www.steel.org/
facts/c3.pdf [hereinafter Facts About Steel]; see also Increase of Steel Imports:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 1999 WL 107124 (Feb. 25, 1999) (Statement of George Becker, President, United Steelworkers of America) [hereinafter Statement of George
Becker] (“Steelworkers have made the steel that has built America and defended this nation throughout its history.”).
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provide the raw material for everything from planes to bombs
— many supporters argue that the steel industry is not only
vital for the economic well-being of America, but also for America’s survival as a nation.33
In conclusion, Section V of this note will argue that the President’s imposition of steel tariffs was an unwise decision on both
the economic and political levels.34 By imposing tariffs on steel
imports, President Bush has not only passed the costs of righting the ailing U.S. steel industry onto domestic steel consumers,35 but he has also used up important international good will
at a time when he cannot afford to do so. In making this decision, the President over-estimated the political capital of the
steel producing industry, and under-estimated the overall effects of imposing tariffs.36
II. U.S. TRADE HISTORY, AND FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE
PRESIDENT’S IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS
The U.S. has been grappling with the question of how to balance the protection of America’s industrial base, with the inherent unfairness of trade restrictions, since its birth as a nation.37
This balancing act has become especially relevant in the last
year, as the debate over the U.S. government’s prolonged protection of the domestic steel industry has once again heated
up.38 In order to fully understand the arguments for and
33. The idea of fostering independence as a rational for protecting industrial capacity was espoused in the trade policies of the founding fathers. See
Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy as Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN
A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 291, 292 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988). Adam
Smith also cited national defense as a worthy reason for instituting restrictive
trade measures in his treatise entitled, “Wealth of Nations.” ADAM SMITH,
WEALTH OF NATIONS 429–31 (1776).
34. See Thomas G. Donlan, Editorial, Caving In for Steel: President Bush
Puts Political Advantage Ahead of Competitiveness, BARRON’S, Mar. 11, 2002,
at 43.
35. Id.
36. This is evident in the back-tracking that has gone on since the tariffs
were instituted, and in the recent preliminary decision by the WTO ruling
against President Bush’s tariffs on steel. See infra Part V.
37. See LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 56–57.
38. See generally Donlan, supra note 34, at 43 (the U.S. has imposed quotas, import restraints and price-fixing on steel imports — and given the domestic steel industry financial aid, technical assistance, tax shelters and other
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against using trade restrictions to protect the steel industry, a
review of the evolution of the U.S.’s international trade policy is
necessary. After a synopsis of U.S. international trade policy,
this section will look to the historical uses of trade restrictions
benefiting the steel industry. The fact that the steel industry
has been granted protection so many times in the past is one of
the main points of contention between those who favor and
those who oppose the imposition of tariffs.39 It is only after a
review of these historical factors that a comprehensive analysis
of President Bush’s steel tariffs may begin.
Arguments between protectionists and those in favor of free
trade have persisted in America since the days of the Revolutionary War.40 Luminaries such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Jefferson, and John Adams all shared a passion for the notion of
free trade.41 Their interest in free trade was, however, balanced
by their skepticism towards relying too heavily on trading partners who had already established their sovereignty.42 This
skepticism was elucidated in Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on
subsidies worth anywhere from $20 billion to $50 billion over the past 30
years); Neil King Jr. and Robert Guy Matthews, So Far, Steel Tariffs do Little
of what President Envisioned, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at A1 (since 1968,
federal efforts to protect the steel industry from imports have cost steel users
$120 billion); see also Press Release, American Institute for International
Steel, Inc., Steel Trade Policy (Oct. 19, 2002), available at
www.aiis.org/steelpolicy.html (the U.S. government used quota protection in
the 1960’s, price controls in the 1970’s, absolute quotas in the 1980’s and early
1990’s, and, most recently, anti-dumping laws to inhibit competition with U.S.
steel producers).
39. Compare Statement of George Becker, supra note 32 (trade restrictions
exist to protect U.S. steel workers from losing their livelihoods, and their way
of life — those who feel otherwise have not seen the painful results of past
failures to protect the steel industry), with Editorial, Free Trade Over a Barrel, WALL ST. J. EUR., July, 12, 2002, at A10 (“Big steel has been given half a
dozen chances in the past 30 years to slim down and speed up behind various
tariff and quota walls. The industry then uses up one of its politically granted
nine lives and keeps coming back for more.”). See also supra note 38.
40. It has been argued that the main reasons behind the Revolutionary
War were the numerous disputes over trade policy between the Colonies and
Great Britain (e.g., the Boston Tea Party and the Townshend Act, etc.). Cooper, supra note 33, at 291.
41. Id. In 1774, Jefferson espoused that “free trade with all parts of the
world” was a “natural right” that no law could ever supplant. Id.
42. Id. The main fear, shared by Jefferson and Adams, was a lack of
reciprocity from the U.S.’s trading partners, in particular, France. Id.
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Manufactures,” which although predominantly protectionist in
its tone, set forth arguments on both sides of the dispute over
trade restrictions that are still echoed today.43 Hamilton’s approach was that America should base its trade policy not on
economic goals, but on the prospect of augmenting the fledgling
nationhood of the former colonies.44 At the time, this approach
called for protection of America’s growing industrial base
through the use of trade restrictions.45 Hamilton did recognize,
however, that restrictions on trade should last only until the
fledgling industry became self-sufficient — after such time, he
believed those measures were evidence of “natural and inherent impediments to success” in that industry.46 It is within this
framework that many of the arguments over the U.S. government’s steel policy take place to this day.47
The U.S. approach to international trade shifted around the
middle of the nineteenth century, from promoting its own
nationhood to promoting the sale of its products abroad.48 The
U.S. government imposed considerable tariffs on all imports
from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1930’s.49 During this
period, American steel played an enormous role in the development of the U.S. as a world superpower.50 In fact, the great

43. See INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 264--66.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 292. The full text of Hamilton’s comment is as follows: “The
continuance of bounties on manufactures long established, must almost always be of questionable policy: because a presumption would arise, in every
such case, that there were natural and inherent impediments to success. But,
in new undertakings, they are as justifiable as they are oftentimes necessary.”
Id.
47. See supra note 39, comparing the contemporary views of steel industry
supporters with those of opponents of continued protection.
48. Cooper, supra note 33, at 291–92.
49. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 69--73 (tariffs on imports during this period ranged from 25–
50%). The period from 1889–1929 was, despite extremely high tariffs on imports, the most rapid period of growth that the American economy has ever
experienced — on average, the economy grew 3.6% per year during this period. Id. at 60. While this was a period of development for the U.S., it is cited
as evidence that protectionist practices are not always bad for the economy as
a whole. Id.
50. See generally PETER KRASS, CARNEGIE (2002).
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steel magnates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century built most of the infrastructure that powered our country
through the Industrial Revolution.51 Interestingly, while being
protected by considerable tariffs on imports during this period,
U.S. steel companies used “differential pricing” policies abroad
in order to capture market-share.52 The zenith of U.S. tariff
practice during this period came in the form of the SmootHawley Tariff Act of 1930.53 It is widely believed that the
Smoot-Hawley Act was one of the main catalysts of the Great
Depression, as its effects reverberated throughout world markets by effectively forcing other countries to impose the same
levels of tariffs.54 This choked off the flow of world trade, which
led to global recession, and, arguably, to World War II.55
America’s post-World War II policy on international trade
was one of promoting full employment and growth, both of
which were conducive to non-turbulent politics and harmony
between countries.56 This new policy was both a response to the
events leading up to World War II, and to the rising threat of
communism from the Soviet Union.57 In this policy shift, the
changing role of the U.S. on the world stage can also be seen.
In less than half a century, America evolved from a developing

51. James Arnold, Steel sector stares into the abyss, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6,
2002), at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1857914.stm.
52. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 67. “Differential pricing” would likely be deemed dumping
by today’s standards.
53. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.). See also Cooper, supra note 33, at 291–92. The Smoot-Hawley
Act raised already high tariffs on imports by 40%–50%. Many economists
believe the Smoot-Hawley Act was the eventual cause of the world-wide
Depression of the mid-1930’s. Id.
54. See id. at 298.
55. Id. In his memoirs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1933–1944) had
this to say on the importance of trade after Smoot-Hawley: “From then on, to
me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and
unfair economic competition, with war. If we could get fewer discriminations
and obstructions [to trade] so that one country would not be deadly jealous of
another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable
chance for a lasting peace.” Id. at 299.
56. Id. at 291–92.
57. Id. at 298–302.
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nation, to one of only two nations vying for dominance on the
world stage.
The end of World War II also brought on the most important
development in world trade to that point — the signing of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (“GATT”).58
The GATT, and its granting of most favored nation (“MFN”)
status to all its members, was designed to insulate imports of
foreign goods from manipulation for reasons of foreign policy or
domestic economic policy.59 The signing of the GATT ushered in
a new era of trade policy for the U.S., one where foreign policy
interests took precedence over other considerations when it
came to international trade.60 Coupled with the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, the GATT brought about
an unprecedented liberalization of trade and financial flows.61
This, in turn, resulted in worldwide economic growth on a scale
that had never before been seen.62
As the GATT evolved,63 the onus of setting the example for
free market economies was shouldered almost exclusively by

58. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 78–79.
59. Cooper, supra note 33, at 301. Of course, membership in GATT, by
itself, became a political tool with which the Western world attempted to manipulate their Cold War communist rivals. Id.
60. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 78. See also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 11–14 (2002) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
61. Together — GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank — are referred to as
the Bretton Woods System. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 60, at 7.
62. Id. However, this explosive growth was not experienced in many eastern bloc countries, as MFN status was rescinded from all Communist countries in 1951. MFN status would become one of the most important, and oftused weapons of the Cold War. Cooper, supra note 33, at 302.
63. To date, there have been three more completed rounds of negotiation —
the Kennedy Round (1964–1967) the Tokyo Round (1973--1979), and the Uruguay Round (1989–1994). LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY,
THEORY, AND THE WTO, supra note 23, at 81–82, 87–88, 101–03. The Uruguay
Round culminated with the creation of the WTO, and accompanying agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Safeguards, Trade in Services, Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and Dispute Settlement. Id. at
101.

File: PRIEST base macro final.doc

2003]

Created on: 6/21/2003 11:21 AM

STEEL TARIFFS

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM

1037

the U.S.64 The result of America leading the way for free markets was that U.S. markets were the most open in the world —
this led to lower prices for consumers, but also to an increase in
imports, which caused employees in domestic industries to lose
their jobs.65 So, as U.S. markets opened further, the livelihoods
of U.S. workers became some of the more notable casualties of
the Cold War.66
The steel industry began to feel the pressure from increased
competition in the 1960’s. In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson
instituted the first trade restrictions specifically designed to
benefit the U.S. steel industry.67 Johnson imposed voluntary
export restrictions (“VER’s”) on steel products from Europe and
Japan in response to an increase in imports. Johnson’s “voluntary” restraints were meant to give the domestic steel industry
breathing room to restructure its businesses.68 These restraints
on steel trade were allowed to lapse in 1974, and another steel
crisis immediately followed.69 In 1977, President Jimmy Carter
approved minimum “fair value” prices for steel imports through
the “trigger price mechanism,” in order to combat a dearth of
64. See PAUL VOLCKER & TOYOO GYOHTEN, CHANGING FORTUNES: THE
WORLD’S MONEY AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 189 (1992) (Trade
Policy leaders believed that the U.S. had a responsibility to put the perceived
interests of the economic system ahead of the short-term concerns of U.S.
producers and workers throughout the Cold War).
65. Id. See also JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 60, at
17.
66. See LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 105. See also THUROW, supra note 31, at 75–78 (the wagepremium that industrial workers in America had enjoyed for so long disappeared gradually from the 1970’s to mid-1990’s).
67. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMINISTRATION, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE — STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND FUTURE
SOLUTIONS 5 (2000), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/steelreport
726.html [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE]. These
restrictions took the form of Voluntary Export Restrictions (“VERs”). While
these restrictions were deemed “voluntary,” this was a misnomer, as the penalties for not complying with the export restrictions were steep. King Jr. &
Matthews, supra note 38. This type of trade restriction was explicitly banned
by the Agreement on Safeguards, signed in 1994. Agreement on Safeguards,
supra note 21.
68. King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38.
69. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 5.
See also Statement of George Becker, supra note 32 (during the steel crisis of
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s over 350,000 steelworkers lost their jobs).
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low-priced steel products from Japan.70 This attempt to curb
imports of steel was largely ineffective, and did little to stave off
the painful restructuring of the U.S. steel industry that took
place in the 1980’s.71 President Ronald Reagan intervened in
1984, and once again imposed “voluntary” restraints on Japanese and European steel exports.72 The idea, once again, was to
give the U.S. steel industry breathing room to restructure and
once again become a viable industry in the face of the major
changes brought about by U.S. international trade policy.73
George H.W. Bush extended Reagan’s VER’s during his term as
President, thereby granting the steel industry a full decade of
relief from low-priced imports.74
This time, the breathing room seemed to work, and new technology once again made U.S. steel producers some of the most
efficient in the world.75 By the time Bill Clinton became President in 1992, the U.S. steel industry appeared to be on the road
to recovery after almost ten years of restructuring.76 Despite
these signs of recovery, however, complaints about unfair competition from abroad continued.77 In 1994, President Clinton

70. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 5;
King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38.
71. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 5.
See also Statement of George Becker, supra note 32. During this period of
restructuring “steelworkers went from being taxpayers to being recipients of
unemployment insurance, food stamps, and welfare payments from federal,
state, and local governments.” Id.
72. King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38. As noted earlier, the term “voluntary” does not accurately describe these trade restrictions, as countries were
forced by the consequences of not complying with the VER’s to capitulate.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 7
(led by “mini-mills” such as Nucor, Inc., the U.S. became a world leader in low
cost steel production in the 1990’s). See also In America’s Fiery Furnace,
ECONOMIST, Sep. 17, 1998. Using electric-arc furnaces and scrap metal, “minimills” now account for almost 40% of American steel production. Id. While
“mini-mills” produce only low-grade steel at present, their technology is improving rapidly. Id.
76. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 6 (in
the late 80’s and early 90’s the U.S. steel industry raised productivity by more
than 300%, and eliminated 330,000 jobs).
77. Id. at 5–6.
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allowed the last of the VER’s to lapse,78 and the steel industry
was once again exposed to unencumbered international competition. The results for the U.S. steel industry were not favorable. Further discussion of steel policy in the latter Clinton
years will follow in the two analysis sections of this note.79
At present, as evidenced by the Bush administration’s opaque
policy regarding international trade, the U.S. economic stance
vis-à-vis the rest of the world has become unclear.80 The Soviet
Union and communism no longer stand as a viable alternative
to democracy.81 The U.S. is now the world’s lone superpower,
and the need to subsidize our allies by sustaining the world’s
most open markets has decreased drastically.82 The forces behind our confused international trade policies are as clear as
they are divergent. Protectionism has become the rallying cry
of American industrial workers, while large corporations — eager to take advantage of the cost savings available in a wider
market — are constant promoters of globalized free trade.83
American workers have been steadily losing ground in terms of
wage premiums for the last forty years, and their anger will
inevitably return to the forefront as foreign policy concerns
move to the rear.84

78. As mentioned earlier, VER’s became illegal under the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, so their extension was not a viable option for President
Clinton. See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 21.
79. See infra Sections III, IV.
80. See Timothy M. Reif and Viji Rangaswami, Joltin’ Joe has Left and
Gone Away – Embracing change: The way forward for U.S. trade policy and
the WTO, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 427, 429 (2001) [hereinafter Reif & Ranaswami] (Citing polls that suggest a “growing disconnect between policy
elites and the public with respect to the purpose, objectives, and benefits of
U.S. trade policy.”).
81. George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at
46.
82. Id.
83. See Jeffrey Sachs, International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of
Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY 217,
218 (Patrick O’Meara et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Sachs, International Economics].
84. See Thurow, New Rules, supra note 18, at 252. The majority of industrial workers in the U.S. facing lower real earnings will sooner or later become
disaffected with democracy. Id. This is a major economic and political dilemma facing the U.S. in the 21st century. Id.
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With the formation of the European Union (“EU”), and the
promulgation of its common currency, the euro, some scholars
believe we will not be alone at the top of the economic heap for
long.85 China could also be hot on the heels of the U.S., as its
recent entrance into the WTO will eliminate many of the hindrances to expansion that previously held it back.86 America
needs to quickly find common ground between the protectionist
instincts of its worker/voters and the capitalist desires of big
business and politicians. If it cannot, we are in danger of not
only losing our economic dominance, but also of reverting back
to a policy of all-out protectionism, not seen since the 1930’s.87
The U.S. steel industry has relied heavily on financial support and trade protection from the U.S. government for the past
four decades, and its needs are once again at the forefront of our
international trade policy.88 Job losses in the steel-making industry have averaged five thousand per year since 2000,89 and
thirty-one steel companies have filed for bankruptcy protection
since 1998.90 The U.S. steel industry faced global competition
without major governmental assistance for the last six years,
and its overall competitiveness has been found wanting again.91
This phenomenon begs the question — is the steel industry
worthy of another grant of breathing room, or is it finally time
to say, let the markets do what they will? The following two
sections will attempt to answer these questions, while keeping
in mind the U.S. steel industry’s storied past, and also consider-

85. Id at 247-48.
86. Hugo Restall, Examining Asia: Who will push free trade? ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002, at A11.
87. See Thomas Bray, Bush caves in to political temptation, THE DETROIT
NEWS, Mar. 20, 2002, at 13 (President Bush lit “a dangerous fuse” by imposing
tariffs, and it is one that history shows will be hard to put out); see Aaron
Bernstein, Backlash: Behind the Anxiety Over Globalization, BUS. WK., Apr.
24, 2000 (“68% of Americans believe globalization drags down U.S. wages.”).
See also Keith W. Hammonds, Freer Trade Gets an Unfriendly Reception, BUS.
WK., Sept. 22, 1997, at 34 (Harris Poll Results: 56% of those polled believe
expanded international trade leads to a decrease in the number of U.S. jobs).
Also, recall discussion of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, at supra note 53.
88. See BCG REPORT, supra note 24, at 7.
89. ECONOMIST, supra note 16.
90. CNN/Europe, Bush backs steel tariffs (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://
europe.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/03/05/steel/index.html.
91. See BCG REPORT, supra note 24, at 7.
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ing the decline of U.S. industrial workers in general over the
same period.
III. PRESIDENT BUSH’S USE OF SECTION 201 — AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
The economic analysis of the Bush administration’s steel tariffs begins with a close look at the requirements of Section 201
of the Trade Act of 1974. The Bush administration claims that
Section 201 was enacted in 1974 to give the Executive Branch
the power to do exactly what President Bush has done in the
instant case — impose tariffs in order to safeguard an American
industry.92 Tariffs on steel were implemented based on the
premise that U.S. steel companies were caused “substantial injury” as a result of a surge in steel imports.93 This section focuses on the idea that the troubles facing steel manufacturers
are not the result of increased quantities of imports, as required
by Section 201; but, rather, they are the result of a downturn in
the global steel market that has magnified the challenges faced
by U.S. steel manufacturers who must already cope with higher
than average production and transportation costs.94 The economic analysis section will conclude that the President’s imposition of sanctions in retaliation for increased quantities of imports was a misuse of the power granted by Section 201, and
should therefore be rescinded.95
In order to come to this conclusion, this section will analyze
the claims put forth in the realm of the WTO dispute resolution
92. See Robert Zoellick, Editorial, The Reigning Champions of Free Trade,
FIN TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002.
93. USEU Report, supra note 2. See also Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975))
(Section 201).
94. See Arnold, supra note 51 (“While it costs $293 to produce a ton of hotrolled coil steel in the U.S., it costs just $212 in the former Soviet Union, and
$185 in Brazil.”). See also, BBC News, Trade War Looms over Steel Dispute,
supra note 5. Steel jobs have decreased in the U.S., the United Kingdom,
Germany, and the rest of the European Union in the past four years: the U.S.
steel industry has lost 20,000 jobs; the U.K. steel industry has lost 10,000
jobs; Germany has lost 7,900 steel jobs; and the EU has lost a total of 22,200
jobs since 1998. Id.
95. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201 requires that any
action “provide greater economic and social benefits than costs”).
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mechanism. While the language of the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards is similar to the language of Section 201 — there
are slight differences, which make the standard for implementing safeguards under the umbrella of the WTO less stringent
than that used by the U.S. government.96 As this section will
show, President Bush’s sanctions will be invalidated under the
less stringent standards used by the WTO, and will inevitably
draw retaliatory sanctions aimed at other, more viable industries.97 This is the most compelling reason why the President’s
imposition of tariffs cannot satisfy Section 201, since it requires
that the economic benefits not outweigh the costs of any action.98 When measured with WTO sanctions in mind, the President’s action fails this test.
To begin, a clear understanding of the requirements that Section 201 places on the imposition of tariffs is needed. The
President made his original request for an investigation into
the effects of imports on the American steel industry to the International Trade Commission (“Commission”) in June, 2001.99
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 reads as follows:
Sec. 201. Action to Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Import
Competition
(a) Presidential action. If the United States International
Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to in this chapter

96. Compare Article 2, ¶ 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards (at supra note
26), with the language of Section 201 above. Note that requirements of the
Agreement on Safeguards are considered less stringent than those of Section
201 because there is no obligation that the safeguards “provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.” Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1975)) (Section
201).
97. Dettmer, supra note 17, at 47. See also CNN/World, EC Compiles U.S.
Tariff ‘Hit’ List, supra note 27 (the EC’s ‘hit list’ of goods includes textiles,
steel, and orange juice). This inevitable rejection by the WTO, coupled with
the U.S.’ tougher standard for the imposition of tariffs, again begs the question, why? The answers apparently cannot be found in economic analysis —
see Section IV, infra for another explanation.
98. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)).
99. USEU Report, supra note 2.
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as the “Commission”) determines under section 202(b)100
that an article is being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of
serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with
the imported article, the President, in accordance with this
chapter, shall take all appropriate and feasible action
within his power which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive
adjustment to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.101

The most important phrases of Section 201, for the purposes
of this note, are “in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury,” and “provide greater economic
and social benefits than costs.” Both phrases, when examined
further, lead to the conclusion that the steel tariffs imposed by
President Bush are not in compliance with the requirements
imposed by Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.
President Bush’s administration was not the first to examine
the most recent surge of imports and its effects on the U.S. steel
industry. Just two years before President Bush began the process of imposing tariffs, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a 235-page report, prepared for the Clinton administration, entitled “Global Steel Trade — Structural Problems and
Future Solutions” (the “Clinton Report”).102 The Clinton Report
provided a comprehensive analysis of the 70% increase of steel
imports in 1998, against the backdrop of a 25% decrease in average steel prices.103 Interestingly, this report concluded that
the majority of this increase in imports came from South Korea,
Japan, Russia, and Brazil.104 Notably, this list does not include
Great Britain, Germany, Australia or China, all four of whom
faced substantial exposure to the Bush administration’s tariff
schedule.105
100. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 202(b) — Investigations
and determinations by commission).
101. Id.
102. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 1.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id. at 2.
105. See BBC News, Trade War Looms Over Steel Dispute, supra note 5.
Perhaps more interesting than the inclusion of E.U. countries, along with
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The Clinton Report took a decidedly different approach to responding to the surge of imports. It chose to focus on the problems with the global steel market in general, and on the new
“mini-mill” steel companies that were driving the U.S. towards
becoming a world leader in low cost steel production.106 The
Clinton Report concluded that the main problem with the steel
industry in the U.S. is not imports, but global over-capacity in
general.107 In response to this report, President Clinton decided
to forego a major interruption in the steel market (i.e. the imposition of tariffs), in favor of bilateral negotiations aimed at reducing global overcapacity.108 The Clinton Report also stated
that, by early 2000, while prices were still low, the U.S. steel
industry was well on its way to recovery, as domestic shipments
were once again on the upswing.109
Data on steel imports from 1999–2001 lends credence to the
Clinton Report’s findings. According to the American Iron and
Steel Institute,110 total imports of steel mill products111 in 1999
were 35,731,000 tons.112 In 2000, total imports of steel mill
products rose 6.2% to 37,957,000 tons — a slight increase.113
Surprisingly, in the year 2001, when the Commission was determining whether an increase in steel imports was damaging
domestic manufacturers, imports of steel mill products fell

Australia and China, in President Bush’s tariff plan, is the fact that Brazil
and Russia will receive more lenient treatment than these countries. Rust
Never Sleeps, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2002. This is despite the fact that the Clinton Report states that the majority of the 1998 import surge came from Korea,
Japan, Russia, and Brazil. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE,
supra note 67, at 2.
106. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 4–7.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Id. at 106.
109. Id. at 8.
110. The American Iron and Steel Institute is a trade group representing
steel and iron producers across the U.S.. The AISI compiles data and industry
reports which are available both online at http://www.steel.org and in hard
copy form.
111. All of the products covered by President Bush’s tariffs fall under the
umbrella of steel mill products. USEU Report, supra note 2.
112. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2000 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA
(2000), at http://www.steel.org/stats/2000.htm.
113. Id.

File: PRIEST base macro final.doc

2003]

Created on: 6/21/2003 11:21 AM

STEEL TARIFFS

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM

1045

20.8% to 30,080,000 tons.114 During the same three-year period,
total steel production by U.S. manufacturers followed roughly
the same pattern by increasing 4.5% from 1999 to 2000, and
falling 11.5% from 2000 to 2001.115 These numbers fail to show
any surge of imports to which the steel industry could attach
blame for the general malaise affecting it.
Furthermore, in the same three-year period, the trade deficit
(the difference between the amount of steel imported by consumers in the U.S., and the amount of steel exported by U.S.
steel producers) in the U.S. steel market actually improved. In
1999, U.S. steel makers exported 5,426,000 tons of steel, while
importing 35,731,000 tons.116 These numbers amount to a trade
deficit of 30,305,000 tons in 1999. In the year 2000, while imports grew only 6.2% to 37,957,000 tons, steel exports increased
20.3% to 6,529,000 tons, and created a deficit of 31,428,000
tons.117 By these numbers, from 1999 to 2000, the trade deficit
in the U.S. steel market grew only 3.6%.118 More interesting
than the slight increase in the steel trade deficit from 1999 to
2000, is the rather large decrease that is seen from 2000 to
2001. In 2001, exports decreased 5.9% to 6,144,000 tons of
steel.119 However, coupled with the aforementioned 20.8% decrease in imports to 30,080,000 tons, this gave the U.S. steel
industry a deficit of 23,936,000 tons.120 This indicates that,
from 2000 to 2001, the trade deficit in U.S. steel decreased by

114. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2001 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA
(2001), at http://www.steel.org/stats/2001.htm. See also Press Release, American Institute for International Steel, AIIS Warns Bush Administration: Current Steel Supply Shortage in U.S. Market Threatens Customers; More Protection Not Needed for Big Steel (Feb. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.aiis.org/release
/?file=release92.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
115. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2000 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA,
supra note 112; AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2001 SELECTED STEEL
INDUSTRY DATA, supra note 114.
116. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2000 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA,
supra note 112.
117. Id.
118. See Id. The author calculated this number on his own, using the AISI’s
statistics.
119. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2001 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA,
supra note 114.
120. Id.
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24%.121 It is therefore counterintuitive to blame the present
state of the steel industry on any import surge in the last three
years.122
Using these numbers, which were released by the American
Iron and Steel Institute (a decidedly pro-steel organization123),
coupled with the report prepared for President Clinton in 2000,
it is hard to agree with the idea proposed by the Bush administration that the steel industry has been crippled in recent
years by a surge in imports. In fact, it appears as if the position
of American steel producers was improving relative to foreign
importers from 1999 to 2001.124
Complicating the President’s case for Section 201 sanctions
further, is the state of the steel industry worldwide. Steel
prices have been eroding steadily for the past twenty years in
all parts of the world.125 Despite constant decreases in steel
prices due to improved technology and the emergence of new,
lower wage producers, managers of steel companies have continued to make capital investments and endure ever-increasing
costs related to labor and retirement benefits.126 This phenomenon is no doubt linked to the presumption that governments will provide protection in case of the inevitable market

121. See Id. The author calculated this number on his own, using the AISI’s
statistics. See also Meltdown, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2001 (Citing the fact that,
as of January, 2001, “imports, which have never accounted for more than
about a third of American steel consumption, are now at their lowest level in
years.”).
122. See Thomas Fuller, U.S. Agency Rejects New Tariffs on Steel, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 28, 2002 (people are starting to realize that, while the
steel industry already has protection, steel companies continue to file for protective measures).
123. See Facts About Steel, supra note 32 (report released by the American
Iron and Steel Institute hailing President Bush’s use of Section 201 safeguards, and implying that more should be done to protect domestic steel producers in the U.S.).
124. See Press Release, American Institute for International Steel, AIIS
Warns Bush Administration, supra note 114. A Decline in import supply to
the U.S., coupled with a slight improvement in demand, created a shortage of
steel supply in the U.S. Id. These factors indicate an improving environment
for domestic steel producers and vitiate any need for steel tariffs. Id.
125. BCG REPORT, supra note 24, at 7.
126. Id. at 5--7 (while the increase of productivity from Russia, Korea, and
Brazil has, predictably, pushed down global steel prices, steel companies have
remained blissfully ignorant of this reality).
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downturns related to operation in a commodity-oriented business.127 Again, it is important to note that the imposition of
steel tariffs will likely lead to the U.S. paying compensation to
the numerous nations affected by this action under the terms of
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.128 This likelihood leads to
the conclusion that the President’s steel tariffs are not in compliance with Section 201.129
The final point of this section is that, by imposing tariffs on
steel, the President has shifted the cost of repairing the ailing
steel producers onto consumers of steel.130 The main consumers
of the steel affected by President Bush’s tariffs are manufacturers such as Ford, General Motors, and Caterpillar — a much
larger economic force than the now beleaguered steel industry.131 An increase in the price of steel, of the sort that has been
brought on by the President’s steel tariffs, affects the price of

127. Id. Steel producers are in the commodities business, so they are constantly operating in a cyclical environment. One of the main problems facing
the global steel industry is that many steel companies operate as if they are
oblivious to the cyclical reality of the world in which their companies operate.
Id at 9. See In America’s Fiery Furnace, supra note 75 (Because of the breathing room provided by governmental protection, “nobody ever goes bust in the
American steel industry.”).
128. Violation of the Agreement on Safeguards would lead the U.S. into the
realm of WTO dispute resolution, where “appropriate compensation would
have to be paid [by the U.S.], either in the form of reducing other trade barriers, or by allowing the affected countries to institute tariffs on other products
as they see fit.” DSU, Article 22 ¶¶1, 2, & 3, supra note 26.
129. To date, the European Union, Japan, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil have all filed actions before the W.T.O.
dispute resolution body — they were consolidated as of July 23, 2002. See
W.T.O., United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, 2002 WL 1622550, at *1 (July 23, 2002). Section 201 requires
that action by the President be taken only when it will “provide greater economic and social benefits than costs.” Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)).
130. Editorial, All hat, no cattle, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2002, at 18. As a side
note, it is apparent that many of the U.S.’s major steel producers were facing
financial crises before the 1998 increase in imports. See Adam Ritt, The Imports Gremlin, NEWSTEEL, Feb. 1999. This is another indication that the Clinton Report was correct in its analysis, and in its focus on righting the overcapacity problem, rather than imposing further restrictions on the steel industry.
131. Editorial, All Hat, No Cattle, supra note 130, at 18.
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everything from soup cans to heavy machinery.132 While the
companies that must pay these higher prices will not be put out
of business, it will affect their margins.133 Companies such as
Ford and Caterpillar can absorb these costs at present, but if
there is a larger economic downturn, the smaller margins
caused by steel tariffs give these much more significant companies less cushion with which to weather the storm.134
The point then seems clear — the President has chosen to
impose tariffs on steel imports, despite evidence that the steel
industry was in fact turning around, and despite the negative
effects the tariffs will have on other, more viable industries.
This stands in direct opposition to the Section 201 requirement
that the imposition of safeguards “provide greater economic and
social benefits than costs.”135
IV. STEEL TARIFFS AND DOMESTIC POLICY — A POLITICAL
ANALYSIS
President Bush, in contrast with the historical tendency of
the Republican Party to support free trade, 136 has, so far in his
first term, not been the champion of free markets he promised
he would be in his election campaign.137 It seems evident, from
the facts set forth in the previous section, that the reasoning
behind the President’s decision to impose steel tariffs cannot be
divined from purely economic analysis. While this is not neces-

132. Ed Lotterman, Steel Tariffs Cave to Politics, But Are Bad Economic
Policy (2002), available at http://www.edlotterman.com/SteelTariffs.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2003).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)).
136. See Magee and Young, Endogenous Protection, supra note 19, at 148.
While the historic stance of the Republican party is one supporting free trade,
Republican presidents have historically been more supportive of protection.
Magee and Young believe this is a result of balancing, as Republican policies
favor high unemployment and low inflation — this is not always a popular
stance for the President to adopt, especially in tough economic times. Id.
137. See Mora, supra note 9 (Bush professed unequivocal support for free
trade during his election campaign); see also Collier, supra note 10, at A3
(Bush faced numerous tough decisions in the wake of his election as to
whether or not he would forge ahead with his campaign promise to promote
free trade).
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sarily surprising, considering the overall nature of the U.S. political system, it is problematic in the sense that market-based
economies like the U.S. require predictability to function at optimum levels.138 This section will attempt to identify the political factors weighing in on the President’s decision. After identifying those factors, conclusions will be put forth as to both the
wisdom of relying on those factors, and the overall effects of doing so.
Amazingly, despite the steel industry’s precipitous decline in
the past 40 years, it has managed to retain a powerful political
front — although steel imports account for only 2% of products
imported into the U.S. each year, 46% of U.S. anti-dumping
measures relate to steel products.139 In short, the industry that
was once the poster-child for American capitalism has become
the champion of the protectionist movement.140 One reason why
the steel industry has been so quick to seek governmental support in the past four decades is that imposing tariffs on steel
products does not have the same effect as the imposition of tariffs in many other industries.141 In most industries, a tariff that
restricts imports in order to drive up their price will, by the
same token, drive down the price of U.S. exports and thereby
discourage their production.142 But, since the U.S. steel industry does not rely on exports to survive, asking for import relief
is an attractive option that is normally less so in other industries.143
138. See Dean Lebaron, Market Efficiency, Feb. 27, 1999 (Markets are most
efficient when there are large numbers of well-informed investors. The
“noise” of unpredicted events causes markets to be inefficient and unpredictable), at http://www.deanlebaron.com/book/ultimate/chapters/mkt_eff.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
139. E C O N O M IST ,supra note 16.
140. See Regarding GATT Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation and its
Significance to the Steel Industry: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade
Committee on Ways and Means, Feb. 8, 1994, 1994 WL 14168260 (testimony
of Joseph Cannon, Chairman of the Board, Geneva Steel, on behalf of the
American Iron and Steel Institute) (“Since 1980, we have probably used U.S.
antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws more than any other
industry. . . .”).
141. Avinish Dixit, How Should the United States Respond to Other Countries’ Trade Policies, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY
at 249, 251 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988).
142. See id.
143. See id.
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The main problem with the U.S. steel industry’s reliance on
protective measures is that they in turn breed retaliation.144
This retaliation should then, in a perfect world, have its own
political ramifications for those who support protective measures. One theory of why retaliatory measures have not had the
requisite amount of negative force to outweigh the positive political impact of “protecting” an industry is that the true effects
of trade intervention are not understood by the electorate.145 To
put it another way, Americans would rather raise tariffs, and
accept punitive measures in return, than support the domestic
industry in question through governmental subsidies.146 This
point sounds like a non-starter, as it would surprise no one to
find out that Americans — or people of any nation for that matter — would rather subsidize an ailing industry through the
imposition of tariffs, than use federal funds for the same purpose.147 The problem is that, while this is obviously politically
favorable, in the end it is more expensive.148 This solution also
creates a credibility problem for President Bush on the world
stage, as his election was largely viewed internationally as a
victory for free trade, and a sign that U.S. markets would become more open during his term, rather than more restricted.149
While the President has seemingly damaged his image as a
champion of free trade with his allegiance to steel producers,
144. Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey A. Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY, at 82 (Robert
M. Stern, ed., The MIT Press, 1988) [hereinafter Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection].
145. Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, Current Issues in Trade Policy:
An Overview, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 17, 41
(Robert M. Stern ed., 1988) [hereinafter Deardorff & Stern, Current Issues in
Trade Policy]. If the public will not protect an industry with subsidies, maybe
that should be taken to mean the industry should not be protected. Id. Protection has the same effects as a subsidy, but it also inflicts further damage on
other parts of the economy. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, supra note
144, at 112.
148. Deardorff & Stern, Current Issues in Trade Policy, supra note 145, at
38. Tariffs are a form of exploitative intervention that presents governments
with a “Hobson’s choice.” Any country can use the tariff at the expense of
other countries, but if all countries use tariffs, they are all likely to lose in the
end. Id.
149. See supra note 5 for the reaction of the U.S.’s major trading partners.
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the benefit of that allegiance may in fact be his election. Looking to the state of West Virginia, it is surprising that George W.
Bush was able to carry the state in the 2000 Presidential election. West Virginia has two Democratic senators, one of whom,
Robert Byrd, has been in office for over forty years.150 West
Virginia, however, is also the state whose fortunes have historically been most closely aligned with that of the steel industry.151
Because of its small size, steel issues — as well as coal — are
able to dominate the political landscape of West Virginia. As it
turns out, the state of West Virginia carries five electoral votes
— all five of which went to George W. Bush in the 2000 election.152 This number seems miniscule until Bush’s margin of
victory is noted — that margin was five electoral votes.153
The steel industry is forced to rely on its political capital, and
the sympathetic nature of its cause to insure protection in
largely because of its former dominance. U.S. steel workers are
among the highest paid industrial workers in the world.154 This
fact is a reflection of strong union power in the steel industry
and a long tradition of automatic productivity raises.155 Unfortunately, those wages have been out of line with actual productivity growth and economy-wide wage growth for years.156 The
only way to protect these disequilibrium wages over the years
has been through restrictive trade policies.157 It is for this rea150. Buchanan, Analysis: Politics of Steel, supra note 30.
151. Id. See Romancing Big Steel, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2002 (Prior to the
2000 election, “Dick Cheney, as George Bush’s running mate, wooed West
Virginia’s steel workers, promising that his boss (unlike Bill Clinton) would
not forget them.”).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, supra note 144,
at 119.
155. Id. See also Meltdown, supra note 121 (“Steel is an old business in
America, dominated by firms such as U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel that
date back to the 19th century. That is a proud legacy but also a costly one,
measured in everything from the size of their pension plans to the cost of
cleaning up old facilities.”).
156. Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, supra note 144,
at 119.
157. Id. See Meltdown, supra note 121 (“Backed by an army of lawyers,
American steel makers have been attacking imports for decades, successfully
winning over one administration after another. Despite years of decline, steel
remains one of the most protected and subsidised industries in America, and
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son that the steel lobby has become so adept at getting its needs
met in recent times. As noted above, the steel industry’s political machine may have played a large role in deciding the 2000
Presidential election.
While an analysis of the U.S. steel industry’s political might,
and its propensity to call for protection, may lead to the implication that U.S. steel companies are the only ones clamoring for
help158 — their complaints coincide with the decline of the
American industrial worker in general.159 The reasons that
Americans should remain skeptical of globalized free trade can
be seen in a pair of economic theories. The first is a concept
recognized in the nineteenth century by David Ricardo, known
as the “law of comparative advantage.”160 The law of comparative advantage postulates that, when free trade is established
between two countries, each country will take on the manufacturing or production duties best suited to it.161 This concept has
negative implications for production-oriented industries such as
the steel industry. It implies that companies, if given the opportunity, will relocate production facilities to countries where
the price of labor is lower.162 While this may not sound the
death knell for American industrial workers — so long as we
are able to maintain a technological and efficiency advantage —
it may have more important negative implications for their bargaining power in future labor disputes.163
The second economic theory that should give American industrial workers pause when they contemplate the benefits of free

one of the main irritants in global trade negotiations, weakening American
arguments for open markets elsewhere.”).
158. See Fuller, U.S. Agency Rejects New Tariffs on Steel, supra note 122.
159. Thurow, New Rules supra note 18, at 249–50.
160. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION, 313 (Ronald M. Hartwell ed., 1971) (1819).
161. Id. See also Sachs, International Economics, supra note 83, at 218.
The theory of comparative advantage is often criticized for depending on a
relatively perfect competitive environment that rarely exists in the real world.
See Paul Krugman, Strategic Sectors and International Competition, in U.S.
TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 207 (Robert M. Stern ed.,
1988).
162. See ECONOMIST, supra note 16 (production costs for steel in the U.S. are
among the highest in the world, second only to Japan).
163. Sachs, International Economics, supra note 83, at 225.

File: PRIEST base macro final.doc

2003]

Created on: 6/21/2003 11:21 AM

STEEL TARIFFS

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM

1053

trade is that of “factor price equalization.”164 At its most basic
level, the theory of factor price equalization states that real
wages for labor in the U.S. will continue to fall, while real
wages in developing countries will continue to rise because
companies can now relocate their production capacity at will.165
Therefore, if this theory is correct in its assumptions, because
the cost of living in the U.S. is bound to be much higher than
that in developing nations, industrial laborers in America may
soon become a thing of the past.166 These are sobering concepts.
America has defined itself by its industrial might for more than
a century, and, while the turn towards technology seems inevitable, there is no doubt that the road ahead will not be smooth
for America’s industrial workers.
The final political factor weighing on President Bush’s decision is the argument that a viable steel industry is an essential
element of national security. The concept of protecting industries in order to preserve national security has existed as long
as the concept of free trade.167 While economists have consistently argued that industries necessary to the preservation of
national security should be given direct subsidies, rather than
supported with restrictions on imports, this has not happened
in the U.S..168 The national security argument carries an inordinate amount of weight at present, and the steel industry, in
its latest campaign entitled “Stand Up for Steel,” missed no opportunity to point this out when lobbying for the present tariff
measures.169 To some degree, a viable steel industry is neces164. Thurow, New Rules, supra note 18, at 249–50.
165. Id. See also Rick Jervis, As Debate on Tariffs Rages, U.S. Steel Expands in EU’s Backyard, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, at A15 (“Steel still is a
labor-intensive industry and, with the U.S.’s high labor costs, you could see
[production facilities] slowly moving [from the U.S.] to the east.”).
166. Thurow, New Rules, supra note 18, at 249–50.
167. See SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 33, at 429–31. See also
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 60, at 22 (in addition to
being necessary for national security purposes, a steel industry may also become an attribute of sovereignty — a crown jewel of sorts).
168. See PETER KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 171 (1985).
169. See Facts About Steel, supra note 32 (“The history of America’s steel
industry is inseparable from our nation’s economic, political and military development.”). See also Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151 (President Bush,
in August 2001, “told cheering steel workers in Pittsburgh that their product
was ‘an important national security issue.’”).
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sary for U.S. national security, but the question remains — how
far must we go to protect this industry?170
V. CONCLUSION
On a macro level, the U.S. has always had difficulties reconciling protectionism and free trade.171 These difficulties stem
from the fact that unfettered free trade begets a sacrifice of sovereignty that the people of the U.S. do not seem eager to countenance.172 Simply put, the problem facing proponents of free
trade in the U.S. is that we live in a democracy. People will
only indulge free trade so long as it does not infringe on their
lifestyle.173 While this decidedly protectionist attitude draws
the ire of many who believe that free trade is essential both to
our economy, and to the overall development of the world,174 the
facts indicate that the people of the U.S. are uncomfortable with
the idea of wholeheartedly embracing globalized free trade.175
Overall, President Bush’s steel tariffs do not score well in a
traditional cost/benefit analysis, where the whole of American
society is viewed.176 Although the steel industry was once the
poster-child of America’s economic might, today it plays only a
small role in our economy. The reasons for the steel industry’s
decline in economic might are numerous; and, while many of
those reasons are the direct result of increased globalization,
170. See Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151 (“The uncertainty lies in the
political calculations. Some Republicans may be at risk if [President] Bush
angers the steel lobby. . . . [President] Bush’s wild approval ratings suggest
he could dare to jilt Big Steel. Less obvious is whether he has the will.”).
171. See LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO,
supra note 23, at 56.
172. See Bernstein, supra note 87.
173. See Id.
174. Bray, supra note 87, at 13.
175. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests, supra note 23
(“In 1999, only twenty-eight percent [of Americans] believed that the U.S.
should lower its trade barriers even if other countries do not.”). See also Bernstein, supra note 87.
176. See Rust Never Sleeps, supra note 105 (“Once again, America’s steel
industry has shown its extraordinary political clout. Against its 160,000
workers, [President] Bush had to weigh the interests of American consumers,
foreign producers and, if his shrillest critics were to be believed, the future of
free trade itself. And yet, in the end . . . steelworkers . . . had the final say.”).
See also Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151 (twelve million people work in
steel-consuming industries, while only 160,000 produce steel).
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some of the blame also lies with the former giants, such as
Bethlehem Steel, and U.S. Steel.177 These former giants still
hold the ear of many politicians in Washington, and have consistently used their political clout to force protectionist measures designed to prop up their failing businesses.178 The steel
industry is the most protected industry in America and will continue as such until the true costs of imposing tariffs are seen
through an economic, rather than political lens.
While President Bush campaigned on a platform of free trade,
his steel tariffs indicate that America’s trade policy is in desperate need of clarification.179 This conclusion has gained validity in the months after the tariffs were first imposed. Since announcing the new tariffs on March 5, 2002, the Bush administration has retreated from its original tariff structure significantly.180 Of the 13 million tons of imported steel originally affected by the tariffs, 25% are now exempt from duties.181 The
President has acquiesced to pressure from large steel using
companies such as Daimler-Chrysler, while leaving smaller
steel users to fend for themselves under the price increases
caused by the tariffs.182 In sum, only the largest of steel using
manufacturers have benefited from President Bush’s backtracking.183
More recently, the WTO released a 900-page preliminary report indicating that the U.S. steel tariffs are a violation of
177. Dettmer, supra note 17, at 47 (“The U.S. steel industry has done little
in the last few years to transform itself from a lame duck to a lean, mean,
manufacturing machine.”). See also In America’s Fiery Furnace, supra note 75
(the fact that American steel has enjoyed governmental protection of some
sort for the past two decades has allowed its major players to put off muchneeded consolidation).
178. See Press Release, American Institute for International Steel, Steel
Trade Policy, supra note 38 (“As a result of the 40-year effort by the domestic
steel industry, the U.S. has the most protective and economically irrational
trade laws in the world. Following quota protection (1960’s), price controls
(1970’s), and absolute quotas (1980’s to the early 1990’s), the latest protectionist weapon of choice for the U.S. steel industry is the dumping law.”).
179. Reif & Ranaswami, Joltin Joe has left and gone away, supra note 80, at
429--30.
180. Neil King Jr. and Geoff Winestock, U.S. Weakens Steel Tariffs Further,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2002, at A2.
181. King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38.
182. King Jr. & Winestock, supra note 180, at A2.
183. Id.
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global trade rules.184 This report, although not final, confirms
this Note’s analysis of the “import surge” relied upon by the
Bush administration in the instant case.185 President Bush’s
response to this report also seems to confirm the notion that
these tariffs are not a product of economic necessity; but,
rather, they are a political invention designed to curry favor in
‘Rust Belt’ states.186 Instead of ending the tariffs now that sanctions on other industries are imminent, the Bush administration plans on appealing the official ruling when it comes out,
and then negotiating with the WTO on appropriate compensation.187 In short, President Bush plans on continuing his subsidization of American steel producers, despite increased costs
to steel consumers and the impending negative consequences to
other industries. 188 As noted in Section III, this disregard for
the economic consequences of imposing tariffs is violative of the
requirement in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, that any
action “provide greater economic and social benefits than
costs.”189 Disregarding the WTO’s ruling will also have international political consequences for the U.S., at a time when we
urgently need international support.
184. Robert Guy Matthews, WTO Says U.S. Tariffs on Steel Violate Rules,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2003, at A2 (“A final WTO decision, which is expected to
follow the preliminary ruling, is due in about a month. The WTO wouldn’t
comment on or confirm the panel’s report.”).
185. See infra Section III (discussing the facts surrounding the ‘import
surge’ that was relied upon by the Bush administration).
186. See Robert Guy Matthews, U.S. Steel Tariffs Likely to Stay Despite
WTO-Sanction Threat, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at A2 (“The Bush administration plans to appeal the official ruling . . . and then start a long process of
negotiations with the WTO.”). See also Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151.
If the E.U. decides to implement retaliatory sanctions, the list of U.S. exports
affected could include textiles, steel, and orange juice. CNN/World, EC Compiles U.S. Tariff ‘Hit’ List, supra note 27.
187. Matthews, U.S. Steel Tariffs Likely to Stay Despite WTO-Sanction
Threat, supra note 186, at A2.
188. See Matthews, WTO Says U.S. Tariffs on Steel Violate Rules, supra
note 184, at A2 (“[S]teel users blame the tariffs for sharply higher prices,
which have increased their own costs, supply shortages and quality issues.
David Pritchard, chief executive of A.J. Rose Manufacturing . . . testified before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, that tariffs added
$1.1 million to the company’s cost of material in the last year and that he was
forced to lay off 33 workers in the past year.”).
189. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201).
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The fact is, we live in a world where it is possible to create a
product in the U.S., ship it to Malaysia to be packaged, and
then put it to market in Europe.190 There is no reasonable way
to turn back from the path of globalized free trade, so the U.S.
must make a concerted effort to live with the world that our
trade policies have, in effect, created.191 It has been said that
the best response to some international events, such as a temporary influx in imports, is one of adjustment in the domestic
economy rather than protected resistance to change.192 This did
not happen in the instant case, and has not happened in the
past forty years with respect to the U.S. steel industry.
As long as the American steel industry can deliver votes, its
ability to induce protective measures from the U.S. government
will remain intact. The steel tariffs of March 5, 2002, are a perfect example of this phenomenon. While their economic benefits
to the nation as a whole will certainly be found lacking, the
benefits to President Bush seem to have already accrued.193
The international fallout has already begun,194 but the consequences of this fallout, which will be seen in retaliatory tariffs
imposed on other more viable industries, have not yet occurred.
When the consequences of President Bush’s imposition of tariffs
are finally felt, someone is sure to be blamed for making a political decision where the laws of economics should have ruled
— the one sure thing is that the blame will not be left at the
feet of the steel industry.
Brady P. Priest∗
190. Sachs, International Economics, supra note 83, at 220.
191. See infra Section II, in particular, the U.S.’s post-World War II trade
policy and the creation of GATT and the WTO.
192. Dixit, How Should the United States Respond, supra note 141, at 249.
193. See infra Section IV, referring to the President’s unlikely victory in
West Virginia, a state largely controlled by the Democratic Party.
194. See infra Section I for the reaction of the U.S.’s major trading partners.
See also Matthews, WTO Says U.S. Tariffs on Steel Violate Rules, supra note
184.
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